How Does Voice Matter? Evidence from the Ultimatum Game
AbstractPrior research in economics and psychology has shown that process can matter in determining outcomes in many social situations. In particular, the opportunity to express ones opinion-voice-has been found to be highly influential. However, little is known about the channels through which voice may operate. In this paper, we develop a simple economic model of voice to explore these channels. We show that individuals value voice for: 1) its effect on outcomes, 2) its inherent value, or 3) its role in signaling one's social standing. Through the introduction of a hypothetical round in the standard ultimatum game, we were able to test the channels of voice directly by observing recipients' responses to offers which are lower than what they asked for. Our experimental results suggest that voice works primarily through its inherent value which appears to exceed its contribution to the perception of procedural fairness. Further, unlike voice which softens the impact of an unfair outcome, the possibility for voice may have dichotomous effects.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tulane University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1004.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
voice; ultimatum game;
Other versions of this item:
- Qiyan Ong & Yohanes Riyanto & Steven Sheffrin, 2012. "How does voice matter? Evidence from the ultimatum game," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 604-621, December.
- D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-10-16 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-10-16 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2010-10-16 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John List & Todd Cherry, 2000. "Learning to Accept in Ultimatum Games: Evidence from an Experimental Design that Generates Low Offers," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 11-29, June.
- Qiyan ONG & Yohanes Eko RIYANTO & Walter E. THESEIRA & Steven M. SHEFFRIN, 2013. "The Self-Image Signaling Roles of Voice in Decision-Making," Economic Growth centre Working Paper Series 1303, Nanyang Technolgical University, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Economic Growth centre.
- Marco Kleine & Pascal Langenbach & Lilia Zhurakhovska, 2013. "Voice Effects on Attitudes towards an Impartial Decision Maker: Experimental Evidence," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Finlay).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.