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The Effective Design of Managerial Incentive Systems: Combining Theoretical Principlesand Practical Trade-offs

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  • Alessandro Rossi

Abstract

On the use of theoretical developments in agency economics for the practical design of incentive- and performance-based compensation systems.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy in its series ROCK Working Papers with number 015.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2001
Date of revision: 12 Jun 2008
Handle: RePEc:trt:rockwp:015

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References

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  1. Dearden, J. & Ickes, B.W. & Samuelson, L., 1988. "To Innovate Or Not To Innovate: Incentives And Innovation In Hierarchies," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics 0-88-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  2. Lazear, Edward P, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 405-31, July.
  3. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
  4. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
  5. Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 1999. "Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 36, pages 2373-2437 Elsevier.
  6. Levinthal, Daniel, 1988. "A survey of agency models of organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 153-185, March.
  7. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 6695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
  9. Kreps, David M, 1997. "Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 359-64, May.
  10. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
  11. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-17, August.
  12. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-39, May.
  13. Barry W. Ickes & Larry Samuelson, 1987. "Job Transfers and Incentives in Complex Organizations: Thwarting the Ratchet Effect," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 275-286, Summer.
  14. Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  15. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June.
  16. Rotemberg, Julio J, 1994. "Human Relations in the Workplace," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 684-717, August.
  17. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
  18. Barron, John M & Gjerde, Kathy Paulson, 1997. "Peer Pressure in an Agency Relationship," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 234-54, April.
  19. Alessandro Rossi, 1999. "Incentives in Managerial Compensation: A Survey of Experimental Research. (Draft Paper)," ROCK Working Papers, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy 003, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy, revised 12 Jun 2008.
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