IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/kyklos/v56y2003i2p199-221.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Access as a Motivational Device: Implications for Human Resource Management

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Arocena
  • Mikel Villanueva

Abstract

In this paper we analyse the provision of incentives at work on the basis that the employment relationship is not solely an exchange of work for money. Particularly, in addition to a salary, a job also gives access to a working experience, which determines the potential for employee's human capital acquisition and for his social and professional recognition. Accordingly, we argue that the level of access defines the employee's opportunities for satisfying his self‐actualisation and achievement needs. Further, given that the firm has the ability to regulate access by way of a number of organisational decisions, access becomes a powerful mechanism to activate the worker's internal motivation. In this respect, the main purpose of this paper is to study the effect of access and intrinsic motivation on employee's performance and job design. To that effect, we analyse the economic consequences of our arguments on access through a model of agency enriched with a number of psychological and organisational considerations. Our results and conclusions are consistent with much of the interdisciplinary research on the subject, as well as with the evidence emerging from the real business practice. They also provide a number of practical implications for personnel policies. First, in order to activate the individual's internal motivation, the job must reach a minimum value. Second, the positive effect of the employee's intrinsic motivation on effort decreases with the magnitude of monetary incentives. Third, the efficiency gains generated by the extension of job access increase with the employee's level of perceived risk. Finally, the costs of selection are a consequence of granting access.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Arocena & Mikel Villanueva, 2003. "Access as a Motivational Device: Implications for Human Resource Management," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 199-221, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:56:y:2003:i:2:p:199-221
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-6435.00217
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6435.00217
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1467-6435.00217?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432.
    2. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-132, Fall.
    3. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    4. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    5. Rotemberg, Julio J, 1994. "Human Relations in the Workplace," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 684-717, August.
    6. Bruno S. Frey, 1994. "How Intrinsic Motivation is Crowded out and in," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(3), pages 334-352, July.
    7. Ichniowski, Casey & Shaw, Kathryn & Prennushi, Giovanna, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 291-313, June.
    8. Lindenberg, Siegwart, 2001. "Intrinsic Motivation in a New Light," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2-3), pages 317-342.
    9. Stephen Wood, 1996. "High Commitment Management and Payment Systems," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(1), pages 53-77, January.
    10. Siegwart Lindenberg, 2001. "Intrinsic Motivation in a New Light," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2‐3), pages 317-342, May.
    11. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
    12. Paul Osterman, 2000. "Work Reorganization in an Era of Restructuring: Trends in Diffusion and Effects on Employee Welfare," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 53(2), pages 179-196, January.
    13. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    14. John Paul Macduffie, 1995. "Human Resource Bundles and Manufacturing Performance: Organizational Logic and Flexible Production Systems in the World Auto Industry," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 48(2), pages 197-221, January.
    15. Frey, Bruno S., 1997. "On the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic work motivation1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 427-439, July.
    16. Kreps, David M, 1997. "Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 359-364, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Martha A. Starr, 2006. "Macroeconomic dimensions of social economics: Saving, the stock market, and pension systems," Working Papers 2006-09, American University, Department of Economics.
    2. Sobia Mahmood, 2011. "An Empirical Investigation on Knowledge Workers Productivity in Telecom Sector of Pakistan," Information Management and Business Review, AMH International, vol. 3(1), pages 27-38.
    3. P. Arocena & Imanol Núñez & Mikel Villanueva, 2007. "The Effect of Enhancing Workers’ Employability on Small and Medium Enterprises: Evidence from Spain," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 191-201, June.
    4. Juan Carlos Zapata Valencia & Santiago Gutiérrez Broncano & Mercedes Rubio Andres, 2013. "El rol del capital humano en la generación de valor: variables determinantes," Revista Ciencias Estratégicas, Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Brent Boning & Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(4), pages 613-650.
    2. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    4. Fali Huang & Peter Cappelli, 2006. "Employee Screening: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 12071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Alessandro Rossi, 2001. "The Effective Design of Managerial Incentive Systems: Combining Theoretical Principlesand Practical Trade-offs," ROCK Working Papers 015, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy, revised 12 Jun 2008.
    6. Gottschalg, Oliver & Zollo, Mauricio, 2006. "Interest alignment and competitive advantage," HEC Research Papers Series 823, HEC Paris.
    7. Kathryn Shaw, 2004. "The Human Resources Revolution: Is It a Productivity Driver?," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 4, pages 69-114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Derek C. Jones & Takao Kato, 2011. "The Impact of Teams on Output, Quality, and Downtime: An Empirical Analysis Using Individual Panel Data," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 64(2), pages 215-240, January.
    9. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
    10. Uwe Jirjahn & Jens Mohrenweiser, 2019. "Performance Pay and Applicant Screening," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 57(3), pages 540-575, September.
    11. Konstantinos Pouliakas, 2010. "Pay Enough, Don't Pay Too Much or Don't Pay at All? The Impact of Bonus Intensity on Job Satisfaction," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 597-626, November.
    12. Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, "undated". "Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats," IEW - Working Papers 187, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    13. Aidan R. Vining, 2003. "Internal Market Failure: A Framework for Diagnosing Firm Inefficiency," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 431-457, March.
    14. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-132, Fall.
    15. Antoinette Weibel & Katja Rost & Margit Osterloh, 2007. "Gewollte und ungewollte Anreizwirkungen von variablen Löhnen: Disziplinierung der Agenten oder Crowding-Out?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 59(8), pages 1029-1054, December.
    16. Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González & Stephen Rassenti, 2011. "Real Effort, Real Leisure and Real-time Supervision: Incentives and Peer Pressure in Virtual Organizations," Working Papers 11-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    17. Pablo Arocena & Mikel Villanueva, 2002. "Acces as a Motivational Device: Implications for Human Resource Management," Working Papers 0201, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Jan 2002.
    18. Nathalie Greenan & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Patricia Crifo, 2004. "Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 164(3), pages 27-55.
    19. Pierre Koning & J. Vyrastekova & S. Onderstal, 2006. "Team incentives in public organisations; an experimental study," CPB Discussion Paper 60, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    20. Guido Friebel & Matthias Heinz & Miriam Krueger & Nikolay Zubanov, 2017. "Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(8), pages 2168-2203, August.
    21. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:56:y:2003:i:2:p:199-221. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.