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Stable Sets for Asymmetric Information Economies

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Abstract

An exchange economy with asymmetrically informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that regulates the information sharing among agents. For it, the notion of stable sets à la Von Neumann and Morgenstern is analyzed. Two different frameworks are taken into account as regards preferences: a model without expectations and a model with expected utility. For the first one, it is shown that the set $V$ of all individually rational, Pareto optimal, symmetric allocations is the unique stable set of symmetric allocations. For the second one, an example is presented which shows that the same set $V$ is not externally stable and a weaker result is proved. Finally, the coalitional incentive compatibility of allocations belonging to the unique stable set is provided.

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  • Maria Gabriella Graziano & Claudia Meo & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2013. "Stable Sets for Asymmetric Information Economies," CSEF Working Papers 333, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:333
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    Cited by:

    1. Núñez, Marina & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2022. "Stable cores in information graph games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 353-367.
    2. Graziano, Maria Gabriella & Meo, Claudia & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2017. "Stable sets for exchange economies with interdependent preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 267-286.
    3. Maria Gabriella Graziano & Claudia Meo & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2023. "Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 27-44, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    sets; asymmetric information; information sharing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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