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Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information

Author

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  • Stefan Maus

Abstract

A condition is given that is equivalent to balancedness of all NTU-games derived from an exchange economy with asymmetric information when endowments are variable. The condition is applicable to the ex-ante model with expected utilities, but also to the more general model of Arrow-Radner type economies without subjective probabilities. Differences in the interpretation of measurability assumptions between these two models are discussed, and another model with information consistent utility functions is developed in which the result would also hold. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Maus, 2003. "Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 613-627, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:22:y:2003:i:3:p:613-627
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0343-2
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sun, Yeneng & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2007. "Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 131-155, October.
    2. Emma Moreno-García & Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, 2020. "Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(1), pages 125-147, February.
    3. Anuj Bhowmik, 2015. "Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(3), pages 461-494, November.
    4. Maria Gabriella Graziano & Claudia Meo & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2015. "Stable sets for asymmetric information economies," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 137-154, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Keywords and Phrases: Balancedness; Core; Communication system; Exchange economy with asymmetric information.; JEL Classification Numbers: C71; D82.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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