IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/udc/wpaper/wp438.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity

Author

Listed:
  • Emma Moreno-García
  • Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

Abstract

We address economies with asymmetric information where agents are not perfectly aware about the informational structure for coalitions. Thus, we introduce solutions that we refer to as risky core and ambiguous core. We provide existence results and a variety of properties of these cooperative solutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Emma Moreno-García & Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, 2017. "Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity," Working Papers wp438, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp438
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/uploads/publicacion/eaf10e5e9407a63d27b040451493128139be866b.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Samet, Dov, 1998. "Common Priors and Separation of Convex Sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 172-174, July.
    2. Beth Allen, 2003. "Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 527-544, March.
    3. Beth Allen, 2006. "Market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October.
    4. Antoine Billot & Alain Chateauneuf & Itzhak Gilboa & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2000. "Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 685-694, May.
    5. Kihlstrom, Richard E. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1974. "Risk aversion with many commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 361-388, July.
    6. Elena L. del Mercato, 2006. "The core of a coalitional exchange economy," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b06047, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    7. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, Decembrie.
    8. Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1991. "The Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(2), pages 183-197, April.
    9. Ghirardato, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo, 2004. "Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 133-173, October.
    10. Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Claudia Meo & Emma Moreno-García, 2014. "Information and size of coalitions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 545-563, April.
    11. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    12. Stefan Krasa & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2005. "The value allocation of an economy with differential information," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 507-526, Springer.
    13. Peter Klibanoff & Massimo Marinacci & Sujoy Mukerji, 2005. "A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1849-1892, November.
    14. Zhiwei Liu, 2016. "Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(4), pages 813-837, October.
    15. Robert Wilson, 2005. "Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 55-64, Springer.
    16. Stefan Maus, 2003. "Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 613-627, October.
    17. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-587, May.
    18. de Castro, Luciano I. & Liu, Zhiwei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2017. "Implementation under ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 20-33.
    19. Koutsougeras, Leonidas C & Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1993. "Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 195-216, April.
    20. Luciano Castro & Marialaura Pesce & Nicholas Yannelis, 2011. "Core and equilibria under ambiguity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 519-548, October.
    21. David Levhari & Jacob Paroush & Bezalel Peleg, 1975. "Efficiency Analysis for Multivariate Distributions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(1), pages 87-91.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Zhiwei & Song, Xinxi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2020. "Randomization under ambiguity: Efficiency and incentive compatibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-11.
    2. Johanna Etner & Meglena Jeleva & Natacha Raffin, 2021. "Climate policy: How to deal with ambiguity?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 263-301, July.
    3. Zhiwei Liu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2021. "Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald’s maxmin preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 801-833, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Anuj Bhowmik, 2015. "Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(3), pages 461-494, November.
    2. De Castro, Luciano & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2018. "Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: Ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 678-707.
    3. He, Wei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2015. "Equilibrium theory under ambiguity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 86-95.
    4. Luciano I. de Castro & Marialaura Pesce & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2013. "A New Perspective on Rational Expectations," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1316, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    5. Martins-da-Rocha, V. Filipe, 2010. "Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1987-2017, September.
    6. Madhav Chandrasekher & Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yves Le Yaouanq, 2022. "Dual‐Self Representations of Ambiguity Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1029-1061, May.
    7. Ghirardato, Paolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2018. "Risk sharing in the small and in the large," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 730-765.
    8. Luciano I. Castro & Marialaura Pesce & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2020. "A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 1-61, March.
    9. Le Van, Cuong & Navrouzoglou, Paulina & Vailakis, Yiannis, 2019. "On endogenous formation of price expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 436-458.
    10. Grant, Simon & Polak, Ben, 2013. "Mean-dispersion preferences and constant absolute uncertainty aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1361-1398.
    11. Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng & Wu, Lei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2017. "Equilibria and incentives in private information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 474-488.
    12. Gottardi, Piero & Tallon, Jean Marc & Ghirardato, Paolo, 2017. "Flexible contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 145-167.
    13. Huiyi Guo & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2022. "Incentive compatibility under ambiguity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 565-593, April.
    14. Youcef Askoura, 2019. "An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information: a correction," Papers 1903.09867, arXiv.org.
    15. König-Kersting, Christian & Kops, Christopher & Trautmann, Stefan T., 2023. "A test of (weak) certainty independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    16. Luciano De Castro & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2011. "Ambiguity aversion solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1106, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    17. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luciano De Castro, 2010. "Uncertainty, Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility," Discussion Papers 1532, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    18. André, Eric, 2014. "Optimal portfolio with vector expected utility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 50-62.
    19. Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Claudia Meo & Emma Moreno-García, 2014. "Information and size of coalitions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 545-563, April.
    20. Martin Dumav & Maxwell B. Stinchcombe, 2021. "The multiple priors of the open-minded decision maker," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 663-692, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp438. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mohit Karnani (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deuclcl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.