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Core and equilibria under ambiguity

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Author Info

  • Luciano Castro

    ()

  • Marialaura Pesce

    ()

  • Nicholas Yannelis

    ()

Abstract

This paper introduces new core and Walrasian equilibrium notions for an asymmetric information economy with non-expected utility preferences. We prove existence and incentive compatibility results for the new notions we introduce.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-011-0637-3
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 48 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 519-548

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:48:y:2011:i:2:p:519-548

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Related research

Keywords: Maximin core; Maximin Walrasian equilibrium; Incentive compatibility; Ambiguity; ex ante; interim and ex post preferences; D51; D6; D8;

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References

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  1. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Gerard Debreu, 1959. "Topological Methods in Cardinal Utility Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 76, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Eduardo Andrade & Luciano De Castro, 2010. "Tougher Educational Exam Leading to Worse Selection," Discussion Papers 1533, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. DREZE, Jacques H. & RUSTICHINI, Aldo, 1995. "Moral Hazard and Conditional Preferences," CORE Discussion Papers 1995010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Guangsug Hahn & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 1997. "Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 383-411.
  6. Koutsougeras, Leonidas C & Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1993. "Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 195-216, April.
  7. Allouch, N. & Florenzano, M., 2000. "Edgeworth and Walras Equilibria of an Arbitrage-Free Exchange Economy," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 2000.119, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  8. Angeloni, Laura & Martins-da-Rocha, Victor-Filipe, 2009. "Large economies with differential information and without free disposal," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/2344, Paris Dauphine University.
  9. Kim, K. H., 1990. "Existence and optimality of competitive equilibria. : C.D. Aliprantis, D.J. Brown, and O. Burkinshaw, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1989, 284 pages, 110 DM," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 197-197, October.
  10. Scott Condie & Jayant Ganguli, 2011. "Informational efficiency with ambiguous information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 229-242, October.
  11. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luciano De Castro, 2010. "Uncertainty, Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility," Discussion Papers 1532, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Joao Correia-da-Silva & Carlos Hervés-Beloso, 2006. "Prudent Expectations Equilibrium in Economies with Uncertain Delivery," FEP Working Papers 216, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
  13. Jayant V Ganguli & Scott Condie, 2008. "Ambiguity and rational expectations equilibria," 2008 Meeting Papers 719, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  14. Florenzano Monique, 1987. "On the non-emptiness of the core of a coalitional production economy without ordered preferences," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8733, CEPREMAP.
  15. Erik Balder & Nicholas Yannelis, 2009. "Bayesian–Walrasian equilibria: beyond the rational expectations equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 385-397, February.
  16. David Schmeidler, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7662, David K. Levine.
  17. Laura Angeloni & V. Martins-da-Rocha, 2009. "Large economies with differential information and without free disposal," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 263-286, February.
  18. Marialaura Pesce & Peter Cramton & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2010. "A new perspective to rational expectations: maximin rational expectations equilibrium," Discussion Papers 1528, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  19. Tjalling C. Koopmans, 1959. "Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 81, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  20. Han Ozsoylev & Jan Werner, 2011. "Liquidity and asset prices in rational expectations equilibrium with ambiguous information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 469-491, October.
  21. Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1991. "The Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 183-97, April.
  22. Krasa, Stefan & Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1994. "The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 881-900, July.
  23. Dana, Rose-Anne, 2004. "Ambiguity, uncertainty aversion and equilibrium welfare," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5393, Paris Dauphine University.
  24. Rose-Anne Dana, 2004. "Ambiguity, uncertainty aversion and equilibrium welfare," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 569-587, March.
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