Formation of cartels in large markets
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 7 (1974)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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- Joachim Rosenmüller & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2010. "Convex vNM-stable sets for linear production games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 311-318, July.
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