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Hot air in Kyoto, cold air in The Hague

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Author Info
Urs Steiner Brandt () (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen () (Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus)

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Abstract

Why did the climate negotiations in The Hague fail? Our contribution is to argue that the conflict between the European Union and the United States stems mainly from disagreement on the cost issue. We argue that three main concerns promoted by the European Union in The Hague, i.e. a 50% national emission ceiling (the supplementarity principle), the use of carbon sinks and an international market control system, can be solved by less restrictions on free GHG trade and by establishing the World Trade Organization as an international authority. Because the US face much higher future reduction costs than the EU, the US will be imposed considerably higher costs than the negotiations in Kyoto were based on. Thus, to make the US stay in an international GHG emission- trading scheme, the EU must reconsider and acknowledge US claims for cheaper reduction options and the right to trade ‘hot air.’ This point is important. If the US do not participate, the increase in emissions will be much higher than the emission reduction following the EU supplementarity proposal.

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File URL: http://www.sam.sdu.dk/ime/PDF/brandt22.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2001-06
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics in its series Working Papers with number 22/01.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2001
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Handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:22

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Related research
Keywords: Hot Air Global GHG Trade Kyoto Protocol The Hague National Emission Ceiling Carbon Sink Control System Cost Issue EU US.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Barrett, Scott, 1998. "Political Economy of the Kyoto Protocol," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 20-39, Winter.
  2. William D. Nordhaus & Joseph G. Boyer, 1998. "Requiem for Kyoto: An Economic Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1201, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Robert N. Stavins, 1999. "The Costs of Carbon Sequestration: A Revealed-Preference Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 994-1009, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2002. "Rent-seeking and grandfathering: The case of GHG trade in the EU," Working Papers 35/02, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2003. "Hot Air as an Implicit Side Payment Arrangement: Could a Hot Air Provision have Saved the Kyoto-Agreement?," Working Papers 42/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2003. "The Political Economy of Climate Change Policy in the EU: Auction and Grandfathering," Working Papers 51/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2003. "Fighting windmills? EU industrial interests and global climate negotiations," Working Papers 37/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Urs Steiner Brandt, 2001. "Uniform Reductions are not that Bad," Working Papers 20/01, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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