The political economy of a tradable GHG permit market in the European Union
AbstractThe EU has committed itself to meet an 8% greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction target level following the Kyoto agreement. Therefore, the EU Commission has just proposed a new directive establishing a framework for GHG emissions trading within the European Union. This proposal is the outcome of a policy process started by the EU Commission and its Green Paper from March 2000. The main industrial stakeholders all had the opportunity to comment on the Green Paper and from their positions we will analyse how far they are winners or losers compared to the final directive proposal. Here, we find that the dominant interest groups indeed influenced the final design of an EU GHG market. This industrial rent-seeking most prominently lead to a grandfathered permit allocation rule like the one found in the US tradable permit systems.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 02-3.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2002
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Aarhus School of Business, Prismet, Silkeborgvej 2, DK 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
Phone: +45 89 486396
Fax: +45 8615 5175
Web page: http://www.asb.dk/departments/nat.aspx
More information through EDIRC
Rent-seeking; European Union; political economy; Kyoto protocol; greenhouse gases; permit trading; grandfathering;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-05-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2003-05-15 (European Economics)
- NEP-POL-2003-05-15 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2002. "Rent-seeking and grandfathering: The case of GHG trade in the EU," Working Papers 35/02, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
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