Hot Air as an Implicit Side Payment Arrangement: Could a Hot Air Provision have Saved the Kyoto-Agreement?

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Hot Air as an Implicit Side Payment Arrangement: Could a Hot Air Provision have Saved the Kyoto-Agreement?

Author Info

Urs Steiner Brandt () (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen () (Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the presence of Hot Air trading jeopardizes the environmental target of an international environmental agree-ment. We argue that Hot Air can be used as an implicit side-payment mecha-nism to actually bring about higher environmental protection compared to the situation without the trade option. We point to the existence of a fundamental trade-off between costs of compliance and the creation of dynamic incentives to develop cheaper reduction technologies. Implicit side-payments, in terms of Hot Air provision, may be needed in order to establish a compromise between these opposing demands. We identify the shortcomings and benefits of allowing fully flexible permit trading including the allocation rule of grandfathering.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics in its series Working Papers with number 42/03.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:42

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Niels Bohrs Vej 9, 6700 Esbjerg
Phone: (+45) 6550 1000
Fax: (+45) 6550 1091
Email:
Web page: http://www.sam.sdu.dk/ime
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ulla H. Oehlenschläger).

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Barrett, Scott, 1998. "Political Economy of the Kyoto Protocol," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 20-39, Winter.
Gusbin, Dominique & Klaassen, Ger & Kouvaritakis, Nikos, 1999. "Costs of a ceiling on Kyoto flexibility," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(14), pages 833-844, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stavins, Robert, 2001. "Lessons From the American Experiment With Market-Based Environmental Policies," Discussion Papers dp-01-53, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2001. "Hot air in Kyoto, cold air in The Hague," Working Papers 22/01, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1992. "The international dimension of environmental policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 379-387, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Grubler, Arnulf & Nakicenovic, Nebojsa & Victor, David G., 1999. "Dynamics of energy technologies and global change," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 247-280, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Barrett, Scott, 1997. "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 345-361, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Want to help out with this project? Look for volunteer opportunities.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.