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| Abstract |
paper. It suggested that a coalition of environmentalists and industrialists successfully lobbied the
US Congress. More strict technology-based standards for new sources than existing sources was the
resulting policy outcome serving the common interest of the coalition because it both offered a
barrier to entry for new firms and improved environmental quality. We focus both on cases from air
and water pollution in the US confirming which seem to confirm this suggestion and the case of
international climate negotiations and the promotion of wind-based energy. In the line of the
Ackerman and Hassler approach we suggest that the reason for EU eagerness to push forward
ambitious reduction target levels (and thereby promote new green industries) is a similar coalition
between industrialists and environmentalists. Such a strategy can be seen in the context of the
Bootleggers and Baptist theory developed by Yandle (1983), where the Baptists (in our case the
environmentalists) demand changes in behaviour on moral reasons. In contrast, the Bootleggers (the
producers of renewable energy), who profit from the very regulation, keep a low profile. The actual
heavy subsidisation of renewable energy sources, such as wind energy, can be viewed as a
successful policy outcome for the coalition of industrialists and environmentalists offering both
market protection and improved environmental quality. Solving the current dead-lock in
international climate negotiations across the Atlantic may well imply fighting the strong coalition of
industrialists and environmentalists. Such a political battle may turn out to be just as tough as
fighting windmills if not clearly investigated in future research.
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.