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The coalition of industrialists and environmentalists in the climate change issue

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Author Info
Brandt, Urs Steiner () (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)
Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard () (Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business)

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Abstract

The political economy idea developed by Ackerman and Hassler (1981) is the starting point of this

paper. It suggested that a coalition of environmentalists and industrialists successfully lobbied the

US Congress. More strict technology-based standards for new sources than existing sources was the

resulting policy outcome serving the common interest of the coalition because it both offered a

barrier to entry for new firms and improved environmental quality. We focus both on cases from air

and water pollution in the US confirming which seem to confirm this suggestion and the case of

international climate negotiations and the promotion of wind-based energy. In the line of the

Ackerman and Hassler approach we suggest that the reason for EU eagerness to push forward

ambitious reduction target levels (and thereby promote new green industries) is a similar coalition

between industrialists and environmentalists. Such a strategy can be seen in the context of the

Bootleggers and Baptist theory developed by Yandle (1983), where the Baptists (in our case the

environmentalists) demand changes in behaviour on moral reasons. In contrast, the Bootleggers (the

producers of renewable energy), who profit from the very regulation, keep a low profile. The actual

heavy subsidisation of renewable energy sources, such as wind energy, can be viewed as a

successful policy outcome for the coalition of industrialists and environmentalists offering both

market protection and improved environmental quality. Solving the current dead-lock in

international climate negotiations across the Atlantic may well imply fighting the strong coalition of

industrialists and environmentalists. Such a political battle may turn out to be just as tough as

fighting windmills if not clearly investigated in future research.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 03-18.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 28 Jan 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:aareco:2003_018

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Aarhus School of Business, Prismet, Silkeborgvej 2, DK 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
Phone: +45 89 486396
Fax: +45 8615 5175
Web page: http://www.asb.dk/departments/nat.aspx
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Related research
Keywords: Political economy; technology-based standards; windmill industry; Kyoto Protocol; EU; US;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Barrett, Scott, 1998. "Political Economy of the Kyoto Protocol," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 20-39, Winter.
  2. Madsen, Erik Strøjer & Jensen, Camilla & Hansen, Jørgen Drud, 2002. "Scale in Technology and Learning-by-Doing in the Windmill Industry," Working Papers 02-2, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Joyeeta Gupta & Lasse Ringius, 2001. "The EU's Climate Leadership: Reconciling Ambition and Reality," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 281-299, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521023894 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Barrett, Scott, 1997. "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 345-361, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Urs Steiner Brandt, 2006. "The Effect of Climate Change on the Probability of Conservation: Fisheries Regulation as a Policy Contest," Working Papers 72/06, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
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