Rent Seeking in Hierarchical Firms
AbstractHierarchical firms are enterprises with rigid internal job ladders. We examine the state enterprise as the prototypical hierarchical firm. In the state enterprise, promotion of employees through the internal hierarchy is determined by the workers’ allocation of time between rent seeking and productive activity. Our model shows that given the incentive structure of the state enterprise we tend to see less productive and more adept rent seekers at senior management positions in such firms. Moreover, as we move up the firm’s hierarchy, a decline in the productivity levels of the workers will be observed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Rutgers University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 200218.
Date of creation: 30 Jul 2002
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More information through EDIRC
hierarchical firms; internal job ladder; promotion; rent-seeking; state enterprise;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
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