The Cooperative Endorsement of a Strategic Game
AbstractThis note provides a way to translate an n-person strategic game to a characteristic cooperative game assuming that the set of players of the cooperative game is the set of pure actions of the strategic game. The Core is characterized through coalitions generated with only one action for each player and the total coalition. We obtain the worth of the total coalition to guarantee the non-emptyness condition. In particular, for a two-player game, this value is equal to the maximal sum of the diagonals.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica in its series QM&ET Working Papers with number 12-9.
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 24 Apr 2012
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Cooperative games; Core;
Other versions of this item:
- Penelope Hernandez & Jose A. Silva-Reus, 2010. "The cooperative endorsement of a strategic game," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour, University of Valencia, ERI-CES 0610, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-05-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-05-02 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-05-02 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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