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Time is not money

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  • Ellingsen, Tore

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

  • Johannesson, Magnus

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

Casual observation suggests that people are more generous with their time than with their money. In this paper we present experimental evidence supporting the hypothesis. A third of our subjects demand no compensation for non-monetary investments, whereas almost all subjects demand compensation for equally costly monetary investments. The finding supports the contention that generosity to some extent is symbolic and context dependent, and that social norms encourage generosity in the time domain.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 663.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 07 Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0663

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Keywords: Altruism; Bargaining; Non-monetary generosity;

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  1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August.
  2. Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2001. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4qz9k8vg, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  3. Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1979. "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 623-38, September.
  4. Bohm, Peter & Linden, Johan & Sonnegard, Joakim, 1997. "Eliciting Reservation Prices: Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Mechanisms vs. Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1079-89, July.
  5. Waldfogel, Joel, 1993. "The Deadweight Loss of Christmas," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1328-36, December.
  6. M. Rabin, 2001. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 511, David K. Levine.
  7. Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2004. "Promises, Threats and Fairness," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 397-420, 04.
  8. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2005. "Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 155-177, February.
  9. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  10. Davidson, R. & Mackinnon, J.G., 1996. "The Size Distorsion of Bootstrap Tests," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 96a15, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  11. Thaler, Richard, 1980. "Toward a positive theory of consumer choice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 39-60, March.
  12. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 2001. "The non-monetary nature of gifts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1793-1810, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Vondolia, Godwin K., 2011. "What do respondents bring into contingent valuation? A comparison of monetary and labour payment vehicles," Working Papers in Economics 508, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  2. Linardi, Sera & McConnell, Margaret A., 2011. "No excuses for good behavior: Volunteering and the social environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(5), pages 445-454.
  3. Bauer, Thomas K. & Bredtmann, Julia & Schmidt, Christoph M., 2012. "Time vs. Money: The Supply of Voluntary Labor and Charitable Donations across Europe," IZA Discussion Papers 6701, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Lorenzo Cappellari & Paolo Ghinetti & Gilberto Turati, 2007. "On Time and Money Donations," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia dell'Impresa e del Lavoro ieil0047, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  5. Nicholas Wilson & Wentao Xiong & Christine Mattson, 2011. "Is Sex Like Driving? Risk Compensation Associated with Male Circumcision in Kisumu, Kenya," Department of Economics Working Papers 2011-14, Department of Economics, Williams College, revised Jan 2012.
  6. Vondolia, Godwin Kofi & Eggert, Hakan & Navrud, Stale & Stage, Jesper, 2011. "What Do Respondents Bring to Contingent Valuation? A Comparison of Monetary and Labor Payment Vehicles," Discussion Papers dp-11-13-efd, Resources For the Future.
  7. Hartman, John Lawrence, 2007. "The Relevance of Heterogeneity in a Congested Route Network with Tolls: An Analysis of Two Experiments Using Actual Waiting Times and Monetized Time Costs," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt22b46341, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.

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