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The cooperative endorsement of a strategic game


  • Penelope Hernandez

    () (ERI-CES)

  • Jose A. Silva-Reus

    () (Universitat de Alicante and IUDSP)


This note provides a way to translate a strategic game to a characteristic cooperative game assuming that the set of players of the cooperative game is the set of pure actions of the strategic game. Coalitions generated with only one action for each player and the total coalition characterize the Core. We calculate the worth of the total coalition to guarantee the non-emptyness condition. In particular, for a two-player game, this value is equal to the maximal sum of the diagonals.

Suggested Citation

  • Penelope Hernandez & Jose A. Silva-Reus, 2010. "The cooperative endorsement of a strategic game," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0610, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
  • Handle: RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0610

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 543-566.
    3. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    4. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, January.
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    More about this item


    Cooperative games; core;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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