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Social Capital in the Urban Informal Sector in Developing Countries – Micro Evidence from Small Textile Producers in Bolivia

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  • Annen, Kurt

    (IISEC, Universidad Católica Boliviana)

Abstract

In a setting with a low level of anonymous trust and without an effective shadow of courts, the possibility to return a low quality good can work as a simple mechanism to overcome moral hazard in buyer seller transactions. Informal firms – in contrast to formal ones – operate in the hidden and do not use receipts for their transactions. They appear on informal markets on a more or less frequent basis. These factors make it difficult for buyers to return a good unless there is a social link between the seller and the buyer. According to this idea, social trust relationships increase sales for informal firms but not for formal ones. Furthermore, formal firms have more sales than informal ones when controlling for the level of social capital of informal firms. The paper uses micro-level data obtained from surveying small textile producers in Bolivia to test these predictions. The results show that family relationships and trust relationships substantially increase sales for informal firms but not for formal ones. Furthermore, informal firms without social capital earn substantially less than formal firms. Instituto de Investigaciones Socio - Económicas, IISEC

Suggested Citation

  • Annen, Kurt, 2006. "Social Capital in the Urban Informal Sector in Developing Countries – Micro Evidence from Small Textile Producers in Bolivia," Documentos de trabajo 3/2006, Instituto de Investigaciones Socio-Económicas (IISEC), Universidad Católica Boliviana.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:iisecd:2006_003
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Kurt Annen, 2001. "Inclusive and Exclusive Social Capital in the Small-Firm Sector in Developing Countries," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(2), pages 319-330, June.
    3. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-1288.
    4. Anke Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2004. "Bilateral bargaining, unverifiable quality, and options to return," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(2), pages 395-410, January.
    5. Ponsati Clara, 2004. "Search and Bargaining in Large Markets With Homogeneous Traders," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-27, February.
    6. Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1990. "Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(1), pages 63-78.
    7. Annen, Kurt, 2003. "Social capital, inclusive networks, and economic performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 449-463, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lacey Ann Wrubel, 2010. "Earnings determinants for own-account workers in the urban informal economy: The case of Bogotá, Colombia," Serie de Documentos en Economía y Violencia 6842, Centro de Investigaciones en Violencia, Instituciones y Desarrollo Económico (VIDE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social Capital; Anonymous Trust; Informal Sector; Small Firms; Instituto de Investigaciones Socio - Económicas; IISEC;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Z00 - Other Special Topics - - General - - - General

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