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The effect of monitoring unemployment insurance recipients on unemployment duration: evidence from a field experiment

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  • John Micklewright

    () (Depatment of Quantitative Social Science - Institute of Education, University of London.)

  • Gyula Nagy

    (Department of Human Resources, Corvinus University of Budapest)

Abstract

Programme administration is a relatively neglected issue in the analysis of disincentive effects of unemployment benefit systems. We investigate this issue with a field experiment in Hungary involving random assignment of benefit claimants to treatment and control groups. Treatment increases the monitoring of claims - claimants make more frequent visits to the employment office and face questioning about their search behaviour. Treatment has quite a large effect on durations on benefit of women aged 30 and over, while we find no effect for younger women or men.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Quantitative Social Science - Institute of Education, University of London in its series DoQSS Working Papers with number 09-02.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 26 Nov 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: forthcoming in Labour Economics
Handle: RePEc:qss:dqsswp:0902

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Keywords: field experiment; monitoring; job search; unemployment insurance; Hungary;

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References

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  1. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, 07.
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  3. Ashenfelter, Orley & Ashmore, David & Deschenes, Olivier, 2005. "Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? Evidence from randomized trials in four U.S. States," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 125(1-2), pages 53-75.
  4. Bruce D. Meyer, 1995. "Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 91-131, March.
  5. Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520, 07.
  6. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
  7. Stephen Nickell & Luca Nunziata & Wolfgang Ochel, 2005. "Unemployment in the OECD Since the 1960s. What Do We Know?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(500), pages 1-27, 01.
  8. Dolton, Peter & O'Neill, Donal, 1996. "Unemployment Duration and the Restart Effect: Some Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 387-400, March.
  9. Annette BERGEMANN & Gerard J. VAN DEN BERG, 2008. "Active Labor Market Policy Effects for Women in Europe – A Survey," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 91-92, pages 385-408.
  10. Graversen, Brian Krogh & van Ours, Jan C., 2008. "How to help unemployed find jobs quickly: Experimental evidence from a mandatory activation program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2020-2035, October.
  11. Micklewright, John & Nagy, Gyula, 2008. "Job Search Monitoring and Unemployment Duration: Evidence from a Randomised Control Trial," CEPR Discussion Papers 6711, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Manning, Alan, 2009. "You can't always get what you want: The impact of the UK Jobseeker's Allowance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 239-250, June.
  13. Cees Gorter & Guyonne R. J. Kalb, 1996. "Estimating the Effect of Counseling and Monitoring the Unemployed Using a Job Search Model," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 31(3), pages 590-610.
  14. Tito Boeri & Katherine Terrell, 2001. "Institutional Determinants of Labor Reallocation in Transition," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 384, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  15. Daniel H. Klepinger & Terry R. Johnson & Jutta M. Joesch, 2002. "Effects of unemployment insurance work-search requirements: The Maryland experiment," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(1), pages 3-22, October.
  16. McVicar, Duncan, 2008. "Job search monitoring intensity, unemployment exit and job entry: Quasi-experimental evidence from the UK," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 1451-1468, December.
  17. Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, 2009. "Gender Differences in Preferences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 448-74, June.
  18. Dan A. Black & Jeffrey A. Smith & Mark C. Berger & Brett J. Noel, 2003. "Is the Threat of Reemployment Services More Effective Than the Services Themselves? Evidence from Random Assignment in the UI System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1313-1327, September.
  19. Jan C. van Ours & Milan Vodopivec, 2006. "How Shortening the Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits Affects the Duration of Unemployment: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(2), pages 351-378, April.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. After all, not that much moral hazard in unemployment insurance?
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-01-20 15:03:00
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Cited by:
  1. Lehmann, Hartmut & Muravyev, Alexander, 2011. "Labor Markets and Labor Market Institutions in Transition Economies," IZA Discussion Papers 5905, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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