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The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts

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  • Guerrazzi, Marco
  • Giribone, Pier Giuseppe

Abstract

In this paper, we explore the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of working hours and wages in a model economy where workers and firms have agreed upon an implicit contract that smooths long-run consumption. Specifically, we analyse a deterministic and a stochastic framework in which a firm inter-temporally sets its level of labour utilization by considering that workers' earnings tend to adjust in the direction of a fixed level that seeks to stabilize their consumption. Without any uncertainty in labour effectiveness, this theoretical setting may have one, two or no stationary solution. The dynamics of the deterministic economy, however, can be assessed only in the two-solution case and it reveals that wages move counter-cyclically towards the allocation preferred by the firm. Adding uncertainty in labour effectiveness does not overturn the counter-cyclical pattern of wages but is helpful in explaining the wage stickiness observed at the macro level.

Suggested Citation

  • Guerrazzi, Marco & Giribone, Pier Giuseppe, 2019. "The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts," MPRA Paper 95978, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:95978
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Guerrazzi & Pier Giuseppe Giribone, 2021. "Dynamic wage bargaining and labour market fluctuations: the role of productivity shocks," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(8), pages 1-20, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Implicit contract theory; Consumption smoothing; Out-of-equilibrium dynamics; Optimal Control;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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