Dynamic Contractual Enforcement: A Model of Strikes
AbstractThis paper provides a theory of strikes as part of a constrained efficient enforcement mechanism for an implicit contractual agreement. A firm possessing contemporaneously private information about demand engages in an enduring relationship with its workforce. If the information becomes perfectly observable subsequently, then, modulo discounting, the first-best is implementable, but strikes are always off the equilibrium path. If the observations of the workforce are imperfect strikes occur in equilibrium. The dynamic contracting problem is modeled as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring. The equilibrium exhibits production inefficiency and incomplete insurance to mitigate the inefficiencies caused by strikes. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 40 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00674033 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2012.
"Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
12013, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2012. "Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00674033, HAL.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.