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A dynamic model of renewable resource harvesting with Bertrand competition

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Beard, Rodney

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Abstract

In this paper a di erential game model of renewable resource ex- ploitation is considered in which rms compete in exploiting a com- mon resource in a Bertrand price-setting game. The model character- izes a situation in which rms extract a common renewable resource which after harvesting may be considered a di erentiated product. Firms then choose prices rather than harvest quantities. Quantities extracted are determined by consumer demand. Optimal price and harvest policies are determined in a linear state di erential game for whichr open-loop and feedback strategies are known to be equuiva- lent. Furthermore, the case of search costs and capacity constraints is analysed and the role they play in determining the dynamics of the resource stock is considered. The results are compared to those of Cournot competition which has been analysed extensively in the literature. Previous studies of di erential games applied to renewable resource harvesting have concentrated on quantity competition (see for example [12]) and the case of price competition has been largely ignored. the exceptions to this have been in the more empirical litera- ture where evidence for price competition versus quantity competition for renewable resources such as sheries is mounting [1]. Consequently the results presented here are not only new, but possibly of greater empirical relevance than existing results on quantity competition.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8916.

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Date of creation: 29 May 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8916

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Related research
Keywords: linear-state differential game Bertrand competition renewable resources fisheries

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Kirman, Alan P. & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2001. "Evolving market structure: An ACE model of price dispersion and loyalty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 459-502, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cellini, Roberto & Lambertini, Luca, 1998. "A Dynamic Model of Differentiated Oligopoly with Capital Accumulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 145-155, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sandal, Leif K. & Steinshamn, Stein I., 2004. "Dynamic Cournot-competitive harvesting of a common pool resource," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1781-1799, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Weninger, Quinn, 1999. "Equilibrium Prices in a Vertically Coordinated Fishery," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 290-305, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Gaudet, Gerard & Moreaux, Michel, 1990. "Price versus Quantity Rules in Dynamic Competition: The Case of Nonrenewable Natural Resources," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(3), pages 639-50, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Martin-Herran, G. & Rincon-Zapatero, J.P., 2005. "Efficient Markov perfect Nash equilibria: theory and application to dynamic fishery games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1073-1096, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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