Equilibrium Prices in a Vertically Coordinated Fishery
AbstractCompetition among processing firms is analyzed in a fishery that is managed under a total allowable catch constraint. Firms compete first in the ex-vessel market for round fish and then in the downstream consumer market. Nash equilibrium prices are characterized at each stage of the vertical market. When the number of processors is sufficiently large, equilibrium prices are approximately Walrasian. The ex-vessel price is close to the processor marginal valuation of the round fish and the consumer price clears the total quantity of processed fish. Implications for market structure, conduct and performance, and fisheries management policy are drawn.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 5175.
Date of creation: 01 May 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, May 1999, vol. 37, pp. 290-305
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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
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Other versions of this item:
- Weninger, Quinn, 1999. "Equilibrium Prices in a Vertically Coordinated Fishery," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 290-305, May.
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