Defaults en carteras hipotecarias, macroeconomía y arreglos institucionales: Más allá de los modelos de Credit-Scoring tradicionales [Mortgage defaults, macroeconomics, and institutional arrangements: Beyond the standard Credit Scoring]
This paper explores determinants of mortgage default, enlightening the transmission mechanisms between the economic cycle, institutional arrangements and the microeconomic event of individual default. It revises the scope and limitations of standard credit-scoring models, that is those generic classification models used by banks to discriminate good from bad debtors. Starting from a microeconomic model of mortgage default, it is shown that there will be some level of strategic defaults, even in a hypothetical world in which standard Credit-Scoring models work perfectly. That means a specification error in standard models, which only capture the solvency-tied fundamentals of repayment, but no the strategic ones triggered by macroeconomic and institutional factors. Some alternative methods and policy measures are suggested.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
7535.
Find related papers by JEL classification: G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
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