Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The supply and demand side impacts of credit market information

Contents:

Author Info

  • Alain de Janvry
  • Craig McIntosh
  • Elisabeth Sadoulet

Abstract

We utilize a unique pair of experiments to study the precise ways in which reductions in asymmetric information alter the outcome in a credit market. We formulate a general model in which the information set held by lenders, and what borrowers believe their lenders to know, enter separately. This model illustrates that non-experimental identification of the supply- and demand-side information in a market will be confounded. We then present a unique natural experiment, wherein a Guatemalan credit bureau was implemented without the knowledge of borrowers, and subsequently borrowers were given a randomized course describing the existence and workings of the bureau. Using this pairing of randomized and natural experiment, we find that the most powerful effect of new information in the hands of lenders is seen on the extensive margin, in their ability to select better clients. Changes in contracts for ongoing borrowers are muted. When borrower in group loans learn that their lender possesses this new information set, on the other hand, we see strong responses on both the intensive margin (changes in moral hazard) and the extensive margin (groups changing their composition to improve performance). We find some evidence that disadvantaged and female borrowers are disproportionately impacted. Our results indicate that credit bureaus allow for large efficiency gains, that these gains are augmented when borrowers understand the rules of the game, and that economic mobility both upwards and downwards is likely to be increased.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.frbsf.org/economics/conferences/0611/3_McIntosh.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in its journal Proceedings.

Volume (Year): (2006)
Issue (Month): Nov ()
Pages:

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfpr:y:2006:i:nov:x:12

Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco, CA 94120-7702
Phone: (415) 974-2000
Fax: (415) 974-3333
Email:
Web page: http://www.frbsf.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.frbsf.org/popups/fiporder.html

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Guinnane, Timothy W., 1999. "The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 195-228, October.
  2. Jappelli, Tullio & Pagano, Marco, 1991. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 579, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. J. Miguel Villas-Boas & Udo Schmidt-Mohr, 1999. "Oligopoly with Asymmetric Information: Differentiation in Credit Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(3), pages 375-396, Autumn.
  4. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 1999. "Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence," CSEF Working Papers 22, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  5. Marcel Fafchamps & Bart Minten, 1999. "Property rights in a flea market economy," CSAE Working Paper Series 1999-25, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
  6. Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2004. "Observing unobservables: Identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment," Natural Field Experiments 00283, The Field Experiments Website.
  7. Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1996. "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Papers 73, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  8. Richard A. Posner, 1980. "The Economics of Privacy," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 16, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  9. Conning, Jonathan, 1999. "Outreach, sustainability and leverage in monitored and peer-monitored lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 51-77, October.
  10. Ghatak, Maitreesh, 1999. "Group lending, local information and peer selection," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 27-50, October.
  11. Jonathan Morduch, 1999. "The Microfinance Promise," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1569-1614, December.
  12. Sergio Navajas & Jonathan Conning & Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, 2003. "Lending technologies, competition and consolidation in the market for microfinance in Bolivia," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(6), pages 747-770.
  13. Posner, Richard A, 1981. "The Economics of Privacy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 405-09, May.
  14. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-74, September.
  15. Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 1997. "Endogenous Communication among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(1), pages 205-36.
  16. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1995. "Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-18, February.
  17. McIntosh, Craig & Wydick, Bruce, 2005. "Competition and microfinance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 271-298, December.
  18. Beatriz Armendariz & Jonathan Morduch, 2007. "The Economics of Microfinance," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262512017.
  19. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  20. Robert Marquez, 2002. "Competition, Adverse Selection, and Information Dispersion in the Banking Industry," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(3), pages 901-926.
  21. Gehrig, Thomas & Stenbacka, Rune, 2007. "Information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 77-99, January.
  22. Greif, Avner, 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 912-50, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Xavier Giné & Jessica Goldberg & Dean Yang, 2011. "Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi," NBER Working Papers 17449, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Guha, Brishti & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2012. "Micro-finance competition: motivated micro-lenders, double-dipping and default," MPRA Paper 36116, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Xiao Xian HUANG & Aurore PELISSIER & Jacky MATHONNAT & Martine AUDIBERT & Anning MA, 2010. "The Impact of the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme on Activities and Financing of Township Hospitals in Weifang, China," Working Papers 201037, CERDI.
  4. Useche, Pilar & Blare, Trent, 2012. "Seeds of Gold: How Environmental Considerations Influence Cacao Production Decisions for Small Landholder Households in Northwestern Ecuador," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124738, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  5. Isabelle Agier & Ariane Szafarz, 2011. "Subjectivity in Credit Allocation to Micro-Entrepreneurs: Evidence from Brazil," Working Papers CEB 11-016, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  6. Ghatak, Maitreesh & de Quidt, Jonathan & Fetzer, Thiemo, 2013. "Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Micro Finance," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 122, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
  7. Isabelle Agier & Ariane Szafarz, 2011. "Credit to Women Entrepreneurs: The Curse of the Trustworthier Sex," Working Papers CEB 11-005, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  8. Sudha Narayanan, 2012. "Notional contracts: The Moral economy of contract farming arrangements in India," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2012-020, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  9. Guirkinger, Catherine & Boucher, Stephen R., 2007. "Credit Constraints and Productivity in Peruvian Agriculture," Working Papers 6882, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedfpr:y:2006:i:nov:x:12

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.