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Price Formation and Market Power in the German Wholesale Electricity Market in 2006

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  • Weigt, Hannes
  • von Hirschhausen, Christian

Abstract

From 2002 to 2006, German wholesale electricity prices more than doubled. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the price components in 2006 in order to identify the factors responsible for the increase. We develop a competitive benchmark model, taking into account power plant characteristics, fuel and CO2-allowance prices, wind generation, cross-border flows, unit commitment and start-up conditions, to estimate the difference between generation costs and observed market prices for every hour in 2006. We find that prices at the German wholesale market (EEX) are above competitive levels for a large fraction of the observations. We verify the robustness of the results by carrying out sensitivity analyses. We also address the issue of revenue adequacy.

Suggested Citation

  • Weigt, Hannes & von Hirschhausen, Christian, 2007. "Price Formation and Market Power in the German Wholesale Electricity Market in 2006," MPRA Paper 65662, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:65662
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul L. Joskow & Edward Kohn, 2002. "A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in California's Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 1-35.
    2. Zachmann, Georg & von Hirschhausen, Christian, 2008. "First evidence of asymmetric cost pass-through of EU emissions allowances: Examining wholesale electricity prices in Germany," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 465-469, June.
    3. Thure Traber & Claudia Kemfert, 2007. "Impacts of the German Support for Renewable Energy on Electricity Prices, Emissions and Profits: An Analysis Based on a European Electricity Market Model," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 712, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    5. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1999. "Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 805-826, September.
    6. Felix Müsgens, 2006. "Quantifying Market Power In The German Wholesale Electricity Market Using A Dynamic Multi‐Regional Dispatch Model," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 471-498, December.
    7. Severin Borenstein & James B. Bushnell & Frank A. Wolak, 2002. "Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1376-1405, December.
    8. Georg Zachmann, 2007. "A Markov Switching Model of the Merit Order to Compare British and German Price Formation," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 714, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    electricity; Germany; market power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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