The aim of this brief paper is to interpret al Qaeda’s modus operandi in the light of the economic theory of contests. The main idea expressed here is that al Qaeda can be considered as a contest-designer rewarding an indivisible prize. Affiliated groups compete with each other to win the prize. The argument is discussed and some tentative policy prescriptions are presented.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
5448.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2005.
"Contests for Status,"
Discussion Papers
139, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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