Al Qaeda as a Tournament: Empirical Evidence
AbstractThis short paper aims to find an empirical evidence that al Qaeda behaves as a contest organizer rewarding an indivisible prize – namely, official membership and economic rewards – to candidate extremists groups. Would-be terrorists must then compete with each other to prove their commitment and ability. Hence to maximize their own probability of winning the prize, each group (maximizes its effort) tries to make attacks at least equally destructive as the foregoing attacks. The testable implication is that: the number of victims must depend upon the number of victims of past attacks. Resulting evidence confirms the hypothesis. At the same time, results show that al Qaeda-style terrorist activity depends also upon grievance for poverty and socio-economic conditions.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 11693.
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
Terrorism; al Qaeda; Contest Theory; Tournament; Information;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
- Berrebi Claude, 2007. "Evidence about the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-38, December.
- Alberto Abadie, 2006.
"Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 50-56, May.
- Abadie, Alberto, 2004. "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism," Working Paper Series rwp04-043, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Alberto Abadie, 2004. "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism," NBER Working Papers 10859, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner & Shi, Xianwen, 2005.
"Contests for Status,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
139, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Rosen, Sherwin, 1986.
"Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-15, September.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999.
"The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
99-75, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005.
"The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly,"
- Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2007. "The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 326-338, August.
- Morgan, John & VÃ¡rdy, Felix, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt0s6752rf, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Andreas Freytag & Jens J. Krüger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2010.
"The Origins of Terrorism: Cross-Country Estimates on Socio-economic Determinants of Terrorism,"
Economics of Security Working Paper Series
27, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Freytag, Andreas & Krüger, Jens J. & Meierrieks, Daniel & Schneider, Friedrich, 2011. "The origins of terrorism: Cross-country estimates of socio-economic determinants of terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(S1), pages S5-S16.
- Andreas Freytag & Jens J. Krüger & Daniel Meierrieks & Friedrich Schneider, 2009. "The Origins of Terrorism - Cross-Country Estimates on Socio-Economic Determinants of Terrorism," Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-009, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Andreas Freytag & Jens J. Krüger & Daniel Meierrieks & Friedrich Schneider, 2009. "The Origins of Terrorism - Cross-Country Estimates on Socio-Economic Determinants of Terrorism," Working Papers 19, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
- Raul Caruso & Andrea Locatelli., 2008.
"Deadly contests: An economic note on al Qaeda's reward system,"
Economics of Peace and Security Journal,
Economists for Peace and Security (UK), vol. 3(2), pages 62-67, July.
- Caruso, Raul & Locatelli, Andrea, 2007. "Deadly Contests An economic note on al Qaeda’s reward system," MPRA Paper 5448, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.