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Al Qaeda as a Tournament: Empirical Evidence

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Author Info
Caruso, Raul

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Abstract

This short paper aims to find an empirical evidence that al Qaeda behaves as a contest organizer rewarding an indivisible prize – namely, official membership and economic rewards – to candidate extremists groups. Would-be terrorists must then compete with each other to prove their commitment and ability. Hence to maximize their own probability of winning the prize, each group (maximizes its effort) tries to make attacks at least equally destructive as the foregoing attacks. The testable implication is that: the number of victims must depend upon the number of victims of past attacks. Resulting evidence confirms the hypothesis. At the same time, results show that al Qaeda-style terrorist activity depends also upon grievance for poverty and socio-economic conditions.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11693/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 11693.

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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11693

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Related research
Keywords: Terrorism; al Qaeda; Contest Theory; Tournament; Information.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Public Economics 0504005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Alberto Abadie, 2004. "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism," NBER Working Papers 10859, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-15, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Bruno S. Frey & Dominic Rohner, 2006. "Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-Game Between Terrorists and the Media," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Raul Caruso & Andrea Locatelli., 2008. "Deadly contests: An economic note on al Qaeda's reward system," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Economists for Peace and Security (UK), vol. 3(2), pages 62-67, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Andreas Freytag & Jens J. Krüger & Daniel Meierrieks & Friedrich Schneider, 2009. "The Origins of Terrorism - Cross-Country Estimates on Socio-Economic Determinants of Terrorism," Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics 2009-009, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2007. "Contests for Status," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 338-363. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2005. "Contests for Status," Discussion Papers 139, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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