Rent seeking, interest groups and environmental lobbying: Cane Farmers versus Great Barrier Reef Protectionists
AbstractIn this paper an interest group model of rent seeking behaviour between sugarcane farmers and environmental protectionists is developed. The motivation for this scenario comes from the debate over fertilizer run-off and its possible impact on Queensland’s Great Barrier Reef. The paper takes Gordon Tullock’s rent-seeking model and applies it to the bargaining process over controls on fertilizer application in an effort to learn something about the likely political outcomes of this debate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 5351.
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Public choice; Environmental economics; Agricultural policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2007-10-20 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-10-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENV-2007-10-20 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2007-10-20 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-10-20 (Regulation)
- NEP-SOC-2007-10-20 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1990. "Public Goods, Rent Dissipation, And Candidate Competition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 115-132, 07.
- Neary, Hugh M, 1997. " A Comparison of Rent-Seeking Models and Economic Models of Conflict," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 373-88, December.
- Hugh Neary, 1997. "A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 373-388, December.
- Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-45, September.
- R. Damania, 1999. "Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(4), pages 415-433, June.
- Beard, Rodney & Wegener, Malcolm, 2001. "Industry Structure and the Reform of the Queensland Sugar Industry: A Computational Model," Economic Analysis and Policy (EAP), Queensland University of Technology (QUT), School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology (QUT), School of Economics and Finance, vol. 31(2), pages 125-137, September.
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