Waiting to Cooperate?
AbstractSometimes cooperation between two parties requires exactly one to cede to the other. If the decisions whether to cede are made simultaneously, then neither or both may acquiesce leading to an inefficient outcome. However, inefficiency may be avoided if a party can wait to see what the other does. We experimentally test whether adding a waiting option to such a two-player cooperation game enhances cooperation. Although subjects cede less overall with the waiting option, we show that they coordinate more and consequently achieve higher profits. Yet, a dark side overhangs waiting: the least cooperative pairs do worse with this option. They wait not to facilitate coordination but to disguise their entry.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 50096.
Date of creation: 22 Sep 2013
Date of revision:
cooperation; endogenous timing; social dilemmas;
Other versions of this item:
- Todd R. Kaplan & Bradley J. Ruffle & Ze’ev Shtudiner, 2013. "Waiting To Cooperate?," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics 1314, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2013-10-02 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2013-10-02 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2013-10-02 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2013-10-02 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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