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Waiting To Cooperate?

  • Todd R. Kaplan

    ()

    (University of Exeter, University of Haifa)

  • Bradley J. Ruffle

    ()

    (Wilfrid Laurier University, Ben-Gurion University)

  • Ze’ev Shtudiner

    ()

    (Ariel University)

Sometimes cooperation between two parties requires exactly one to cede to the other. If the decisions whether to cede are made simultaneously, then neither or both may acquiesce leading to an inefficient outcome. However, inefficiency may be avoided if a party can wait to see what the other does. We experimentally test whether adding a waiting option to such a two-player cooperation game enhances cooperation. Although subjects cede less overall with the waiting option, we show that they coordinate more and consequently achieve higher profits. Yet, a dark side overhangs waiting: the least cooperative pairs do worse with this option. They wait not to facilitate coordination but to disguise their entry.

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File URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Working/1314.pdf
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Paper provided by Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1314.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1314
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  1. Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2001. "Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(474), pages 749-65, October.
  2. Gul, Faruk & Lundholm, Russell, 1995. "Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents' Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 1039-66, October.
  3. Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
  4. Gale, D. & Chamley, C., 1992. "Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment," Papers 10, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  5. Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Kene Boun My & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud & Marc Willinger, 2006. "Strategic Delay and Rational Imitation in the Laboratory," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-35, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  6. Potters, J.J.M. & Sefton, M. & Vesterlund, L., 2003. "After You - Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games," Discussion Paper 2003-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Timothy Cason & Sau-Him Lau & Vai-Lam Mui, 2013. "Learning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 335-357, October.
  8. Todd R. Kaplan & Bradley J. Ruffle, 2011. "Which Way to Cooperate," Working Papers 1105, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  9. MiguelA. Fonseca & Hans-Theo Normann, 2008. "Mergers, Asymmetries and Collusion: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(527), pages 387-400, 03.
  10. Engelmann, Dirk & Grimm, Veronika, 2008. "Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences," IWQW Discussion Paper Series 03/2008, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung (IWQW).
  11. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-171671 is not listed on IDEAS
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