IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpio/0510006.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Entry and Exit With Information Externalities

Author

Listed:
  • stefano comino

    (Dipartimento di Economia, Università di Trento)

Abstract

In the paper we analyze how the possibility of revealing information to a competitor alters the entry/investment behavior of a first entrant. We show that once it has entered the market, the firm might refrain from making further profitable investments in order to hide information from the competitor. Moreover, we show that before entering the market, the first entrant anticipates that there is a strategic advantage in choosing an initially small scale of entry: in this way it 'commits' itself to revealing the true state of the market with its subsequent decisions and this fact is beneficial since it induces the competitor to postpone entry into market.

Suggested Citation

  • stefano comino, 2005. "Entry and Exit With Information Externalities," Industrial Organization 0510006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0510006
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 25. An updated version of the paper is forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and it is available as 'article in press' in the homepage of the journal
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/io/papers/0510/0510006.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Somma, Ernesto, 1999. "The effect of incomplete information about future technological opportunities on pre-emption," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 765-799, August.
    2. Otto Toivanen & Michael Waterson, 2005. "Market Structure and Entry: Where's the Beef?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 680-699, Autumn.
    3. Alexander-Cook, Kim & Bernhardt, Dan & Roberts, Joanne, 1998. "Riding free on the signals of others," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 25-43, January.
    4. Ashoka Mody & Krishna Srinivasan, 1998. "Japanese and United States Firms as Foreign Investors: Do they march to the same tune?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 778-799, November.
    5. Mody, Ashoka & Yuko Kinoshita, 1997. "The usefulness of private and public information for foreign investment decisions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1733, The World Bank.
    6. Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John, 1998. "Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and Search," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(446), pages 60-74, January.
    7. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    8. McGahan, A. M., 1993. "The effect of incomplete information about demand on preemption," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 327-346, September.
    9. Chamley, Christophe & Gale, Douglas, 1994. "Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1065-1085, September.
    10. Giovanni Maggi, 1996. "Endogenous Leadership in a New Market," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 641-659, Winter.
    11. Gul, Faruk & Lundholm, Russell, 1995. "Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents' Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 1039-1066, October.
    12. Sayuri Shirai & Dongpei Huang, 1994. "Information Externalities Affecting the Dynamic Pattern of Foreign Direct Investment: The Case of China," IMF Working Papers 1994/044, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Spencer, Barbara J. & Brander, James A., 1992. "Pre-commitment and flexibility : Applications to oligopoly theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1601-1626, December.
    14. Rafael Rob, 1991. "Learning and Capacity Expansion under Demand Uncertainty," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(4), pages 655-675.
    15. Wheeler, David & Mody, Ashoka, 1992. "International investment location decisions : The case of U.S. firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 57-76, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Ángel Ropero, 2021. "Entry deterrence when the potential entrant is your competitor in a different market," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 87(3), pages 1010-1030, January.
    2. GEORGANTZIS, Nikolaos & moner-colonques, Rafael & ORTS, Vicente & SEMPERE-MONERRIS, José J., 2012. "Theoretical and experimental insights on firms’ internationalization decisions under uncertainty," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2012041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Juan Alcácer & Cristian Dezső & Minyuan Zhao, 2015. "Location choices under strategic interactions," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 197-215, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christophe Caron & Thierry Lafay, 2008. "How Risk Disciplines Pre-Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 205-226, November.
    2. Nathan Yang, 2011. "An Empirical Model of Industry Dynamics with Common Uncertainty and Learning from the Actions of Competitors," Working Papers 11-16, NET Institute.
    3. Brindisi, Francesco & Çelen, Boğaçhan & Hyndman, Kyle, 2014. "The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 264-281.
    4. Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John, 2000. "Mass layoffs and unemployment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 121-142, August.
    5. Enrico Pennings, 2004. "Optimal Pricing And Quality Choice When Investment In Quality Is Irreversible," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 569-589, December.
    6. Rose Cunningham, 2004. "Investment, Private Information and Social Learning: A Case Study of the Semiconductor Industry," Macroeconomics 0409021, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Heidhues, Paul & Melissas, Nicolas, 2012. "Rational exuberance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1220-1240.
    8. Eric Rasmusen & Young-Ro Yoon, 2008. "First versus Second-Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Size of New Markets," Working Papers 2008-15, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    9. Marc Santugini, 2020. "On the consumer problem under an informational externality," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 149-161, April.
    10. Céline Azemar & Grégory Corcos & Andrew Delios, 2006. "Taxation and the international strategy of Japanese multinational enterprises," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00590421, HAL.
    11. Boğaçhan Çelen & Kyle Hyndman, 2012. "An experiment of social learning with endogenous timing," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(2), pages 251-268, September.
    12. Dewit, Gerda & Leahy, Dermot, 2004. "Rivalry in uncertain export markets: commitment versus flexibility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 195-209, October.
    13. Desbordes, Rodolphe, 2007. "The sensitivity of U.S. multinational enterprises to political and macroeconomic uncertainty: A sectoral analysis," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 16(6), pages 732-750, December.
    14. Tidiane KINDA, 2010. "Increasing Private Capital Flows To Developing Countries: The Role Of Physical And Financial Infrastructure In 58 Countries, 1970-2003," Applied Econometrics and International Development, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 10(2).
    15. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Morgan, John, 2010. "Clock games: Theory and experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 532-550, March.
    16. Levin, Dan & Peck, James, 2008. "Investment dynamics with common and private values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 114-139, November.
    17. Fang, Di & Richards, Timothy, 2016. "New Maize Variety Adoption in Mozambique: A Spatial Approach," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235388, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    18. Tao Wang, 2011. "Dynamic Equilibrium Bunching," Working Paper 1291, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    19. Sault, Joanne & Tovianen, Otto & Waterson, Michael, 2003. "Learning And Location," Economic Research Papers 269587, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    20. Gaballo, Gaetano & Marimon, Ramon, 2021. "Breaking the spell with credit-easing: Self-confirming credit crises in competitive search economies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-20.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Entry; Information Externalities; Wait and See; First Entrant; Strategic Behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0510006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: EconWPA (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.