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Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences

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  • Dirk Engelmann
  • Veronika Grimm

Abstract

We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking mechanism suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) as well as repeated interaction in different settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve. We find that applying the exogenous mechanism captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains, whereas repeated interaction leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only in a setting where players can choose their partners. --

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02515.x
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 122 (2012)
Issue (Month): 563 (09)
Pages: 1010-1041

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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:122:y:2012:i:563:p:1010-1041

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Cited by:
  1. Alessandra Casella & Sébastien Turban, 2012. "Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote Markets," NBER Working Papers 18573, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Casella, Alessandra & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2010. "Competitive equilibrium in Markets for Votes," CEPR Discussion Papers 7992, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Kaplan, Todd & Ruffle, Bradley, 2007. "Which way to cooperate," MPRA Paper 3381, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Kaplan, Todd & Ruffle, Bradley & Shtudiner, Zeev, 2013. "Waiting to Cooperate?," MPRA Paper 50096, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Rosemarie Nagel, 2013. "The role of information in different bargaining protocols," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 88-113, March.
  6. Todd Cherry & Stephen Cotten & Stephan Kroll, 2013. "Heterogeneity, Coordination and the Provision of Best-Shot Public Goods," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 497-510, December.
  7. Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2010. "A simple mechanism for resolving conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 375-391, November.

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