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Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences

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  • Engelmann, Dirk
  • Grimm, Veronika

Abstract

We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking mechanism suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) as well as repeated interaction in different settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve. We find that applying the exogenous mechanism captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains, whereas repeated interaction leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only in a setting where players can choose their partners. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung (IWQW) in its series IWQW Discussion Paper Series with number 03/2008.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:iwqwdp:032008

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Web page: http://www.iwqw.rw.uni-erlangen.de/
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Related research

Keywords: Experimental Economics; Mechanism Design; Implementation; Linking; Bayesian Equilibrium; Efficiency;

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Cited by:
  1. Todd R. Kaplan & Bradley J. Ruffle, 2011. "Which Way to Cooperate," Working Papers 1105, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  2. Casella, Alessandra & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2010. "Competitive equilibrium in Markets for Votes," CEPR Discussion Papers 7992, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Kaplan, Todd & Ruffle, Bradley & Shtudiner, Zeev, 2013. "Waiting to Cooperate?," MPRA Paper 50096, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Alessandra Casella & Sébastien Turban, 2012. "Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote Markets," NBER Working Papers 18573, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Todd Cherry & Stephen Cotten & Stephan Kroll, 2013. "Heterogeneity, Coordination and the Provision of Best-Shot Public Goods," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 497-510, December.
  6. Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Rosemarie Nagel, 2012. "The Role of Information in Different Bargaining Protocols," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  7. Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2010. "A simple mechanism for resolving conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 375-391, November.
  8. Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2010. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-721, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

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