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Procedural Concerns and Reciprocity

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Author Info
Sebald, Alexander

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Abstract

Different to other scientific disciplines traditional economic theory has remained remarkably silent about procedural aspects of strategic interactions. Much to the contrast, among psychologists there is by now a broad consensus that not only expected outcomes shape human behavior, but also procedures that are used to take decisions. It is argued that procedural concerns are especially pervasive in the resolution of conflicts. In our paper we show that procedural concerns are in fact an inherent feature of the interaction of reciprocal agents. More precisely, using Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)’s theory of sequential reciprocity we demonstrate that procedural choices determine the responsibility that people have for outcomes. The responsibility for outcomes in turn influences peoples’ evaluations of intentions and, hence, subsequent reactions. Two applications are discussed to highlight the impact and importance of procedural concerns in strategic interactions.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4508/
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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5066/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 4508.

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Date of creation: 04 Jun 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4508

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Related research
Keywords: Psychological Games Procedural Concerns Reciprocity

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Gary E Bolton & Jordi Brandts & Axel Ockenfels, 2005. "Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1054-1076, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Cremer, David De & Knippenberg, Daan van, 2003. "Cooperation with leaders in social dilemmas: On the effects of procedural fairness and outcome favorability in structural cooperation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 1-11, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2006. "A theory of reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 293-315, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nalebuff, B. & Shubik, M., 1988. "Revenge And Rational Play," Papers 138, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  8. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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