Political power and aid tying practices in the development assistance committee countries
AbstractUsing a panel of 22 OECD Development Assistance Committee countries over the 1979-2009 period, this paper examines the link between donor-political institutional features, particularly the fragmentation of executive power and the degree of competition in the legislative branch of government, and the share of tied aid in the aid budget of a donor. The empirical results show tied aid, both in levels and as a percentage of total aid, increases as the number of decision makers within the governing coalition increases and decreases as the proportion of excess seats a governing coalition holds above a simple majority increases.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 39463.
Date of creation: 14 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Official Development Assistance (ODA); tied aid; fragmented government; political economy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
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