Political power and aid tying practices in the development assistance committee countries
AbstractThis paper examines on a panel of 22 OECD Development Assistance Committee countries whether fragmentation of executive power and the degree of competition in the legislative branch of government increases the amount of tied aid over the 1979-2009 period. Fragmentation and competition are broadly defined as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aid expenditure are internalized by decision makers and the relative strength of the government’s position vis-à-vis legislative composition respectively. The empirical results show tied aid, both in levels and as a percentage of total aid, increases as the number of decision makers within the government increases and decreases as the proportion of excess seats a governing coalition holds above a simple majority increases.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 49806.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Oxford Development Studies 3.41(2013): pp. 372-390
Official Development Assistance (ODA); tied aid; fragmented government; political economy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-09-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2013-09-28 (Positive Political Economics)
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