Donor Strategy under the Fungibility of Foreign Aid
AbstractWe develop a political-economic model of aid fungibility: a part of aid is diverted away from its intended target by lobby groups. The size of this diversion - the degree of aid fungibility - is determined endogenously by the recipient government. The donor can affect the equilibrium degree of fungibility by choosing both the size of aid and the timing of its decision. We derive a condition under which the donor's reaction to fungibility is to reduce the amount of aid. Under this condition, if the donor acts as a follower, both the donor and the target group are better off. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economics & Politics.
Volume (Year): 16 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (07)
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