Asymmetric information and financial markets
AbstractThis paper aims to explore the relevance of the Asymmetric Information and the Theory of Argumentation TA in the complex area of financial crises. Specifically, we investigated the scope of the phenomenon of persuasion in advertising. It examines advertisements in publications notable economic movement in Colombia. The financial communication is important to distinguish how to run the models of behavior based on beliefs of agents. Consequently, investors' beliefs can also change systematically with changes in market prices
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 39025.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Financial crises; Financial markets; economy; theory argumentation; information; advertising;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- M3 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising
- M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2012-06-05 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CFN-2012-06-05 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-CTA-2012-06-05 (Contract Theory & Applications)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Journal of Political Economy,
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- Estrada, Fernando, 2006.
"Herbert Simon y la economía organizacional
[Herbert Simon and the organizational economic]," MPRA Paper 20071, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Jan 2007.
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