Who Contributes? A Strategic Approach to a European Immigration Policy
AbstractAccording to the Lisbon Treaty the increasing cost of enforcing the European border against immigration shall be shared among the EU members. Nonetheless, the Treaty is rather vague with respect to the "appropriate measures" to adopt in order to distribute the financial burden. Members who do not share their borders with source countries have an incentive to free ride on the other countries. We study a contribution game where a northern government and a southern government minimize a loss function with respect to their national immigration target. We consider both sequential and simultaneous decisions and we show that the contribution of both governments is positive when their immigration targets are not too different. We show that total contribution is higher when decisions are simultaneous, but the conditions for both contributions to be positive are less restrictive in the sequential framework.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 33421.
Date of creation: Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Policy making; Government expenditures; Local government expenditures; Federalism;
Other versions of this item:
- Giuseppe Russo & Luigi Senatore, 2013. "Who contributes? A strategic approach to a European immigration policy," IZA Journal of Migration, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-16, December.
- Giuseppe Russo & Luigi Senatore, 2012. "Who Contributes? A Strategic Approach to a European Immigration Policy," CSEF Working Papers 306, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2011-09-22 (European Economics)
- NEP-MIG-2011-09-22 (Economics of Human Migration)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Russo, Giuseppe, 2008.
"Voting over Selective Immigration Policies with Immigration Aversion,"
6845, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Giuseppe Russo, 2011. "Voting over selective immigration policies with immigration aversion," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 325-351, December.
- Giuseppe Russo, 2008. "Voting over Selective Immigration Policies with Immigration Aversion," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2008_14, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
- Giuseppe Russo, 2011. "Voting over Selective Immigration Policies with Immigration Aversion," CSEF Working Papers 289, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Paolo E. Giordani & Michele Ruta, 2009.
"The Immigration Policy Puzzle,"
Working Papers CELEG
0905, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.
- repec:pdn:wpaper:23 is not listed on IDEAS
- Claus-Jochen Haake & Tim Krieger & Steffen Minter, 2013.
"On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU,"
International Economics and Economic Policy,
Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 583-612, December.
- Claus-Jochen Haake & Tim Krieger & Steffen Minter, 2010. "On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU," Working Papers CIE 25, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, .
"Incentives and incomplete information,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
- Karin Mayr & Steffen Minter & Tim Krieger, 2009.
"Policies on illegal immigration in a federation,"
Working Papers CIE
23, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
- Benhabib, Jess, 1996. "On the political economy of immigration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1737-1743, December.
- Giovanni Facchini & Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2006.
"Asylum seekers in Europe: the warm glow of a hot potato,"
Journal of Population Economics,
Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 411-430, June.
- Giovanni Facchini & Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2005. "Asylum Seekers in Europe: The Warm Glow of a Hot Potato," Development Working Papers 205, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.
- Tito Boeri & Herbert Brücker, 2005. "Why are Europeans so tough on migrants?," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 20(44), pages 629-703, October.
- Russo, Giuseppe & Senatore, Luigi, 2011.
"A Note on Contribution Games with Loss Functions,"
33423, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Warr, Peter G., 1982. "Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 131-138, October.
- repec:pdn:wpaper:25 is not listed on IDEAS
- Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1984. "Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(375), pages 580-98, September.
- Facchini, Giovanni & Willmann, Gerald, 2005. "The political economy of international factor mobility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 201-219, September.
- Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
- Varian, Hal R., 1994. "Sequential contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 165-186, February.
- Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211.
- Senatore, L, 2011. "Public Good Provision with Convex Costs," MPRA Paper 36984, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.