Asylum seekers in Europe: the warm glow of a hot potato
AbstractThe Common European Asylum System calls for increased coordination of the EU countriesâ policies towards asylum seekers and refugees. In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of the effects of coordination, explicitly modelling the democratic process through which policy is determined. In a symmetric, two-country citizen-candidate setup, in which accepting asylum seekers in one country generates a cross-border externality in the other, we show that coordination is desirable. Internalizing the externality leads to a welfare improvement over the nonâcooperative outcome. However, contrary to suggestions by many observers, we show that allowing for cross-country transfers in the cooperative outcome leads to a welfare inferior outcome because the possibility of compensation exacerbates strategic delegation effects.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Population Economics.
Volume (Year): 19 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00148/index.htm
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Other versions of this item:
- Giovanni Facchini & Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2005. "Asylum Seekers in Europe: The Warm Glow of a Hot Potato," Development Working Papers 205, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.
- J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
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