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Enforcement of Property Rights in a Barter Economy

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  • Hoffmann, Magnus
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    Abstract

    If property rights to consumption goods are insecure, the incentives to trade in a barter economy are reshaped. In a pure exchange economy, we examine the case where two contestable consumption goods are vital to two agents and initial endowments follow a binary distribution. In line with the existing literature, we examine in a two-stage game how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined. We find that, in equilibrium, two different regimes emerge, depending on the exogenous preference and appropriationeffectiveness parameters: Peaceful coexistence and trade and appropriation,with the former regime strictly Pareto-dominating the latter regime.

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    File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3260/
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    File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6181/
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 3260.

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    Date of creation: 2006
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    Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:3260

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    Keywords: Barter Exchange; Contests; Security of Property Rights;

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    1. Anderton, Charles H. & Carter, John R., 2008. "Vulnerable trade: The dark side of an Edgeworth box," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 422-432, November.
    2. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September.
    3. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January.
    4. Charles Anderton, 1999. "Exchange of Goods or Exchange of Blows? New Directions in Conflict and Exchange," Working Papers, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics 9902, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    5. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1991. "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 130-34, May.
    6. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, S.J., 1997. "Anarchy and Autarky: Endogenous Predation as a Barrier to Trade," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 383, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 01 Oct 2001.
    7. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 1993. "The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 83-102, Winter.
    8. Herschel I. Grossman, 2001. "The Creation of Effective Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 347-352, May.
    9. Bush, Winston C. & Mayer, Lawrence S., 1974. "Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-412, August.
    10. Kjell Hausken, 2004. "Mutual Raiding of Production and the Emergence of Exchange," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(4), pages 572-586, October.
    11. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
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