Model of the 2000 Presidential Election: Instrumenting for Ideology
AbstractIn a spatial model of voting, a voter's utility for a candidate is a function of ideological distance from the candidate and a candidate's quality. Candidate quality can potentially bias the measure of ideological distance in two ways. First, voters may be more drawn to high quality candidates thereby reducing the ideological distance. Second, a candidate's ideological position is a function of rivals�qualities and his own quality. We derive a theoretical model to sign the direction of both biases analytically. Next, using techniques established in the industrial organization literature, we estimate the model using two sets of instrumental variables.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 16264.
Date of creation: 21 Apr 2009
Date of revision:
spatial voting; discrete choice; instrumental variables;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-07-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2009-07-28 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-POL-2009-07-28 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Steven Callander, 2005. "Electoral Competition in Heterogeneous Districts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 1116-1145, October.
- Newey, Whitney K., 1987. "Efficient estimation of limited dependent variable models with endogenous explanatory variables," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 231-250, November.
- J. Miguel Villas-Boas & Russell S. Winer, 1999. "Endogeneity in Brand Choice Models," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 45(10), pages 1324-1338, October.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. " Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-36, June.
- Norman Schofield, 2006. "Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 183-203, December.
- Stern, Steven, 1994.
"Two Dynamic Discrete Choice Estimation Problems and Simulation Method Solutions,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 76(4), pages 695-702, November.
- Steven Stern, 1994. "Two Dynamic Discrete Choice Estimation Problems and Simulation Method Solutions," Virginia Economics Online Papers 389, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Lin, Tse-Min & Enelow, James M & Dorussen, Han, 1999. " Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 98(1-2), pages 59-82, January.
- Arianna Degan, 2007. "Candidate Valence: Evidence From Consecutive Presidential Elections," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 457-482, 05.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.