Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm
AbstractWe consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer's model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13612.
Date of creation: 24 Feb 2009
Date of revision:
Forchheimer; Dominant firm; Price leadership;
Other versions of this item:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-03-07 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2009-03-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2009-03-07 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2009-03-07 (Microeconomics)
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