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Endogenous market structures and antitrust policy

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  • Federico Etro

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s12232-009-0088-3
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Review of Economics.

Volume (Year): 57 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 9-45

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Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:57:y:2010:i:1:p:9-45

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Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/12232

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Related research

Keywords: Antitrust; Endogenous entry; Leadership; Chicago school; L1;

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References

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  1. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
  2. Attila Tasnádi, 2010. "Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 99(3), pages 251-266, April.
  3. Federico Etro, 2011. "Endogenous Market Structures And Strategic Trade Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(1), pages 63-84, 02.
  4. Federico Etro, 2008. "Stackelberg Competition with Endogenous Entry," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1670-1697, October.
  5. Barry Nalebuff, 2004. "Bundling as an Entry Barrier," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(1), pages 159-187, February.
  6. F. Etro, 2007. "Endogenous Market Structures and Macroeconomic Theory," Review of Business and Economics, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, vol. 0(4), pages 517-540.
  7. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-65, March.
  8. Erkal, Nisvan & Piccinin, Daniel, 2010. "Cooperative R&D under uncertainty with free entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 74-85, January.
  9. Färnstrand Damsgaard, Erika, 2009. "Patent Scope and Technology Choice," Working Paper Series 792, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  10. Boone, J., 2000. "Competition," Discussion Paper 2000-104, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  11. Armstrong, M. & Doyle, C. & Vickers, J., 1995. "The access pricing problem: a synthesis," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9532, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  12. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Triole, 2002. "Platform Competition in Two Sided Markets," FMG Discussion Papers dp409, Financial Markets Group.
  13. Kesternich, Iris & Schumacher, Heiner, 2009. "On the Use of Information in Repeated Insurance Markets," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 280, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  14. Daughety, Andrew F, 1990. "Beneficial Concentration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1231-37, December.
  15. John Vickers, 2009. "Competition Policy and Property Rights," Economics Series Working Papers 436, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  16. Ledezma, Ivan, 2013. "Defensive Strategies in the Quality Ladders," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4966, Paris Dauphine University.
  17. Nisvan Erkal & Daniel Piccinin, 2006. "Horizontal Mergers with Free Entry in Differentiated Oligopolies," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 976, The University of Melbourne.
  18. Federico Etro, 2006. "Aggressive leaders," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 146-154, 03.
  19. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
  20. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919.
  21. Tesoriere, Antonio, 2008. "Endogenous timing with infinitely many firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1381-1388, November.
  22. Amable, Bruno & Demmou, Lilas & Ledezma, Ivan, 2010. "Product market regulation, innovation, and distance to frontier," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/3716, Paris Dauphine University.
  23. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-59, March.
  24. Creane, Anthony & Konishi, Hideo, 2009. "The unilateral incentives for technology transfers: Predation (and deterrence) by proxy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 379-389, May.
  25. Davidson, Carl & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2007. "Horizontal mergers with free entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 157-172, February.
  26. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
  27. Werden, G.J. & Froeb, L.M., 1996. "The Entry Including Effects of Horizontal Mergers," Papers 96-08, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
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Cited by:
  1. Batlome Janjgava, 2013. "Free Entry and Social Efficiency under Unknown Demand Parameters," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp495, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  2. Etro, Federico, 2013. "Advertising and search engines. A model of leadership in search advertising," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 25-38.

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