Competition Policy and Property Rights
AbstractOne of the most controversial questions in current competition policy is when, if ever, should competition law require a firm with market power to share its property, notably intellectual property, with its rivals?� And if supply is required, on what terms?� These questions are discussed with reference to recent law cases including the EC Microsoft judgment of 2007 and the US linkLine case of 2009.� The analysis focuses on whether competition law and regulation are complements or substitutes, and on incentives for investment and (sequential) innovation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 436.
Date of creation: 01 May 2009
Date of revision:
Property rights; Refusal to supply; Price squeeze; Intellectual property; Sequential innovation; Antitrust;
Other versions of this item:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property Rights
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-06-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-06-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2009-06-03 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2009-06-03 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAW-2009-06-03 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2009-06-03 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2009-06-03 (Regulation)
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