Patent Scope and Technology Choice
AbstractThis paper analyzes the effect of an increase in patent scope on R&D and innovation. It presents a model where patent scope affects an entrant firm's technology choice and thereby creates a trade-off between R&D investments and wasteful duplication of R&D. The model predicts that an increase in patent scope can increase the probability of innovation if the incumbent’s profit increase from innovation is large and the patented technology has a small advantage over the alternative technology. However, when the model is extended to Stackelberg competition or licensing, the benefit of a broad patent scope to a large extent disappears.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 792.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 03 Mar 2009
Date of revision:
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Phone: +46 8 665 4500
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More information through EDIRC
Innovation; Patents; Patent policy; Licensing;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-INO-2009-03-22 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2009-03-22 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-KNM-2009-03-22 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
- NEP-LAW-2009-03-22 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2009-03-22 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-TID-2009-03-22 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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