This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Patent Scope and Technology Choice

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Färnstrand Damsgaard, Erika () (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of an increase in patent scope on R&D and innovation. It presents a model where patent scope affects an entrant firm's technology choice and thereby creates a trade-off between R&D investments and wasteful duplication of R&D. The model predicts that an increase in patent scope can increase the probability of innovation if the incumbent’s profit increase from innovation is large and the patented technology has a small advantage over the alternative technology. However, when the model is extended to Stackelberg competition or licensing, the benefit of a broad patent scope to a large extent disappears.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp792.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 792.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 03 Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0792

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 665 4500
Fax: +46 8 665 4599
Email:
Web page: http://www.ifn.se/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Elisabeth Gustafsson).

Related research
Keywords: Innovation; Patents; Patent policy; Licensing;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1983. "Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 741-48, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Blundell, Richard & Griffith, Rachel & van Reenen, John, 1999. "Market Share, Market Value and Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(3), pages 529-54, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Federico Etro, 2004. "Innovation by leaders," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 281-303, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Lerner, Josh, 1995. "Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 463-95, October.
  5. Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1995. "On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 20-33, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Kitch, Edmund W, 1977. "The Nature and Function of the Patent System," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 265-90, October.
  7. Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, 1990. "Optimal Patent Length and Breadth," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 106-112, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. James Bessen & Eric Maskin, 2006. "Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation," Economics Working Papers 0025, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Klemperer, Paul, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," CEPR Discussion Papers 392, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Pankaj Tandon, 1983. "Rivalry and the Excessive Allocation of Resources to Research," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 152-165, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Zeira, Joseph, 2003. "Innovations, Patent Races and Endogenous Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 3974, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Nancy T. Gallini, 1992. "Patent Policy and Costly Imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 52-63, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS is also providing many rankings, for example of authors and institutions.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.