Defensive strategies in the quality ladders
AbstractThis paper analyses the potentially defensive behaviour of successful innovators and its effect on aggregate R&D effort. It proposes a quality-ladders model that endogenously determines leader's technology advantages and who innovate (the leader firm or its competitors). Regulation can have either a positive or a negative effect on R&D intensity. It can be negatively associated to aggregate innovative effort in higly deregulated economies. In more regulated ones, where deterring strategies are constrained, it yields incentives to innovate. These predictions are consistent with data on manufacturing industries of 14 OECD countries between 1987-2003.
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Date of creation: Oct 2008
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innovative leaders ; quality ladders ; R&D; regulation ; industry-level data;
Other versions of this item:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-04-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2011-04-30 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-INO-2011-04-30 (Innovation)
- NEP-REG-2011-04-30 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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