Dynamic Coordination Via Organizational Routines
AbstractWe investigate dynamic coordination among members of a problem-solving team who receive private signals about which of their actions are required for a (static) coordinated solution and who have repeated opportunities to explore different action combinations. In this environment ordinal equilibria, in which agents condition only on how their signals rank their actions and not on signal strength, lead to simple patterns of behavior that have a natural interpretation as routines. These routines partially solve the team's coordination problem by synchronizing the team's search efforts and prove to be resilient to changes in the environment by being ex post equilibria, to agents having only a coarse understanding of other agents' strategies by being fully cursed, and to natural forms of agents' overconfidence. The price of this resilience is that optimal routines are frequently suboptimal equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 439.
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision: Jan 2011
Other versions of this item:
- Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell & Heidhues, Paul, 2011. "Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 355, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Andreas Blume & April M. Franco & Paul Heidhues, 2011. "Dynamic coordination via organizational routines," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-11-10, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-04-23 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-04-23 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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