Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation
AbstractWe propose to experimentally study decentralized organization learning. Our objective is to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of other agents. An important distinction of our approach is that we test predictions from a simple stylized model of organizational learning with fully rational agents, developed in Blume and Franco, 2004. Decentralization is captured through explicit constraints on the joint strategies of the agents in the organizations. Rather than exogenously specifying individual learning rules, the model predicts learning behavior and ties its predictions to parameters about individual preference and about properties of organizations. This model yields sharp testable predictions about behavior in the organization and about how this behavior varies with the fundamental variables that characterize the organization. A side benefit from this research is that it sheds light on the roles of symmetry and randomization in games. The games we consider have numerous pure strategy equilibria. The efficient behavior is complex and asymmetric. In contrast, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium which is inefficient. Our preliminary results show that with repeated random pairwise matching the inefficient symmetric equilibrium provides a better description of behavior
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2004 Meeting Papers with number 617.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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Organizational learning; experiments;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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- Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell & Heidhues, Paul, 2011.
"Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
355, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Andreas Blume & April M. Franco & Paul Heidhues, 2011. "Dynamic coordination via organizational routines," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-11-10, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
- Andreas Blume, 2011. "Dynamic Coordination Via Organizational Routines," Working Papers 439, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2011.
- Sourav Bhattacharya & John Duffy & Sun-Tak Kim, 2011. "Compulsory and Voluntary Voting Mechanisms: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 456, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2013.
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