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Signaling about norms: Socialization under strategic uncertainty

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Author Info

  • Fabrizio Adriani

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Leicester)

  • Silvia Sonderegger

    ()
    (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)

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    Abstract

    We consider a society with informed individuals (adults) and naive individuals (children). Adults are altruistic towards their own children and possess information that allows to better predict the behavior of other adults. Children benefit from adopting behaviors that conform to the social norm determined by aggregate adult behavior, but, lacking accurate information, have to rely on the observed behavior of their adult parent to infer the norm. We show that this causes a signaling distortion in adult behavior. Compared to the benchmark case of no signaling, parents have a higher propensity to adopt attitudes that encourage their children to behave in a socially safe way, i.e. the way which would be optimal under maximum uncertainty about the prevailing social norm. This distortion is different in nature from the typical distortion due to a conflict of interest between sender and receiver in standard signaling games. The norm-signaling bias is self-reinforcing and might lead both to (Pareto) superior and inferior outcomes relative to the case of no signaling. We discuss applications to sexual attitudes, collective reputation, and trust.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 2013-11.

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    Date of creation: Nov 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:not:notcdx:2013-11

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    Web page: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/
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    Related research

    Keywords: Signaling; Norms; Strategic Uncertainty; Complementarities; Coordination Games; Socialization.;

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